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Introduction
The U.S. Constitution’s allocation of military authority has adapted over time to
major shifts in American power and grand strategy. This paper explains, with a
focus on U.S. military actions in East Asia and possible scenarios of special joint
concern to the United States and Japan, that the president in practice wields
tremendous power and discretion in using military force. Although formal, legal
checks on the president’s use of force rarely come into play, Congress nevertheless
retains some political power to inﬂuence presidential decision-making. The
president’s powers are also constrained by interagency processes within the
executive branch, and alliance relations often feed into those processes.
This paper is mostly focused on U.S. domestic law issues. It also touches,
however, on a few key questions of international law, especially as they relate to
presidential power to interpret international law and to possible crisis scenarios of
current concern.

The Constitutional
Framework
Drafted in the late 18th century, the U.S. Constitution divided responsibility for
military affairs between Congress and the president, providing several checks on
presidential uses of force. The Constitution vests “executive power” in the president
and designates him “commander in chief ” of military forces. But it assigns to
Congress responsibility for creating, maintaining, and funding those military
forces, and gives Congress the power to “[d]eclare war.” The constitutional framers
generally wanted to give the president uniﬁed, tactical control over military forces,
but they wanted Congress to retain primary control over decisions to go to war. The
framers were also sensitive to political opposition to large, standing military forces,
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which many Americans associated at the time with repression and a proclivity
toward war.
Even from the start, this division of constitutional authority left ambiguous
whether and under what circumstances the president could unilaterally engage
in military activities. Although early presidents were usually hesitant to use much
military force without explicit congressional backing—particularly since standing
U.S. military forces were small and the president therefore relied on Congress to
provide continuing ﬁnancial support for them—over time a practice accumulated
of unilateral presidential deployments and limited uses of military force short of
all-out war in the absence of legislative prohibitions.
During the ﬁrst half of the 19th century, for example, presidents
authorized punitive raids and shows of military force in Sumatra and Paciﬁc
islands, typically to protect American commercial interests. In the 1850s, the
president ordered Commodore Matthew Perry to lead a Navy squadron on a
diplomatic mission, using a show of military force, to open trade and other
relations with Japan. On several occasions during that decade, presidents sent
small military forces to defend U.S. interests in China, and likewise in Korea
during the decades that followed. In 1900, the president dispatched about 5,000
troops to China, as part of a multinational expeditionary force responding to
the “Boxer Rebellion.”1 Especially after the United States gained territories in
Asia following the Spanish-American War—one of only ﬁve declared wars in
American history, though many other military operations have been authorized
by Congress—presidents frequently directed armed forces to intervene in that
region to protect American interests.
As Louis Henkin explains in his treatise of U.S. foreign relations law:
By repeated exercise without successful opposition, Presidents have
established their authority to send troops abroad, probably beyond effective
challenge, where Congress is silent, but the constitutional foundations and
the constitutional limits of that authority remain in dispute.2
Nevertheless, through the ﬁrst half of the 20th century, it was still widely agreed
that, except in cases of repelling an attack against the United States, only Congress
could take the nation to full-blown war (as opposed to much more limited uses of
military force, even if they involved some combat).
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Post-World War II
Presidential Powers
Several interrelated factors in the years immediately following World War II
combined to dramatically increase the president’s power to use military force.
These factors include more expansive constitutional theory regarding presidential
powers, the formation of mutual defense treaties, and the establishment of a
permanent, large-scale military force.
First, presidents during most of the Cold War asserted very broad
prerogatives to use even relatively large-scale force without congressional
authorization. Executive branch lawyers adopted an expansive view of presidential
foreign relations and military powers, and Congress largely acquiesced. The Korean
War, which was never expressly authorized by Congress but lasted more than three
years and cost the lives of over 33,000 U.S. troops, stands out as a turning point.
It marked the largest unilateral military action abroad by a president to date and
was justiﬁed by vigorous and expansive executive branch claims of constitutional
power.3 As Arthur Schlesinger describes the ascendancy of an “imperial presidency”
at that time:
The menace of unexpected crisis hung over the world, demanding, it was
supposed, the concentration within government of the means of instant
decision and response. All this, reinforcing the intellectual doubt about
democratic control of foreign relations, appeared to argue more strongly
than ever for the centralization of foreign policy in the Presidency.4
Since the Korean War, successive presidential administrations have asserted
that the president, by virtue of his power to manage foreign relations and his
role as commander in chief, has broad authority to initiate military operations
that he deems to be in the national interest. The Justice Department has
acknowledged in recent years that some large-scale military operations might
be of such size, intensity, and nature as to constitutionally require congressional
authorization. This point could be important in legal debates about possible
military action against North Korea, given the likely large magnitude of such
action, but, as explained below, that legal threshold may not in practice be of
much consequence.5
Second, the United States concluded a set of defense pacts around the world,
including with allies in the Asia-Paciﬁc region, and these alliances contributed
to a growth of presidential powers. These pacts included the Philippines (1952),
Australia and New Zealand (1952), the Republic of Korea (1954), the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization (1954), the Republic of China (1955), and Japan (1960).
In the Japan case, the security treaty provides that:
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Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the
territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own
peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger
in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such
armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance
with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be
terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
restore and maintain international peace and security.6
Defense pacts turned the traditional American aversion to “entangling alliances”
on its head; whereas for most of its history, American strategic thinking rested on
the idea that the alliances might draw the United States into unnecessary wars,
post-war thinking rested on the idea that alliances were necessary to prevent wars
that would engulf the United States. These defense pacts meant that presidents
could, in effect, rely on a pre-commitment of public support for military action to
defend these allies. Presidents also justiﬁed expansive unilateral power to use force
on the need to preserve the credibility of American security guarantees. Bilateral
and regional security treaties generally contain a provision specifying that
mutual defense will take place in accordance with each party’s own constitutional
processes. This allowed the executive and legislative branches to paper over
differences about constitutional prerogatives during ratiﬁcation, but in practice
the executive branch has asserted authority to invoke these provisions unilaterally.
In other words, whereas one might think of international law as a likely constraint
on executive branch discretion to use force, presidents have repeatedly used
multilateral or regional security agreements as a basis for defending broader
executive power with regard to military force.7 As Mira Rapp-Hooper and I
recently wrote:
Some of the president’s constitutional powers relevant to alliances—such as
the power to direct military operations in war and to appoint ambassadors
(subject to Senate conﬁrmation)—have always been clear. Starting in the
early Cold War, though, the centrality of alliances to U.S. foreign policy
contributed to the vast accumulation of additional presidential powers—
some of them delegated by Congress and others established through
executive branch practice over time. After nearly 70 years, presidential
authority over U.S. security guarantees now appears to be almost entirely
unilateral.8
A third major factor contributing to presidential powers to use force was that the
United States maintained large, standing military forces after World War II, and
the permanence of these forces diminished constraints on presidential power to
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use them. Throughout most of its history, the United States had maintained very
small or modest peacetime military forces. It mobilized wartime military forces to
meet crises, and then it quickly demobilized them post war. With the advent of the
Cold War, however, the United States never demobilized to the extent it had in the
past. Large numbers of U.S. troops have for decades been stationed on bases in, for
example, Japan and South Korea, in addition to a major U.S. naval presence in the
Paciﬁc at all times. Especially when combined with a nuclear arsenal, this largescale standing military power guarantees that a president, as commander in chief,
has had permanently-ready forces at his disposal.
As a result of these and other factors, from the early Cold War onward the
president has had wide latitude with regard to initiating force, and Congress has
often played a reactive, sometimes even passive, role. For the purposes of this
paper, one notable counter-example, in which the president showed signiﬁcant
deference to Congress, was President Dwight Eisenhower’s approach toward
Taiwan (then Formosa) in 1955. In threatening to use force—possibly including
nuclear weapons—to defend Nationalist China-controlled islands against
aggression by Communist-China, Eisenhower sought and obtained explicit
congressional approval to use whatever military means he deemed necessary.
Even in seeking congressional approval, however, Eisenhower asserted that he
had independent constitutional power to take some military measures anyway,
and this case of seeking congressional approval for military intervention in
advance stands out as more an exception than the norm.9 More typically, in the
Vietnam War, for example, presidents slowly escalated U.S. military involvement
before requesting and receiving very broad congressional authorization (in
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution) to use military force to defend U.S. and allied
interests in Southeast Asia. As public opposition to the war grew, Congress
found it difﬁcult to resist presidential requests for additional funds. Eventually,
that opposition reached the point that Congress passed or threatened to pass
legislative restrictions on the conduct of the war, pushing President Nixon to
wind it down.10
Following the Vietnam War, Congress tried to adjust the balance of power
among the political branches by enacting, over President Nixon’s veto, the 1973
War Powers Resolution.11 Its stated purpose was to defend the constitutional
framers’ original constitutional vision: that the “collective judgment of both the
Congress and the president will apply to the introduction of United States Armed
Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities
is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in
hostilities or in such situations.” 12 The War Powers Resolution stipulates that if the
president sends U.S. forces into combat, he must withdraw them within 60 days
unless Congress declares war or expressly authorizes the president to use force.
Over time that law has been watered down in several ways, however, and Congress
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has not proven willing to enforce it strictly by further exercising its legislative
powers. 13
In practice, the president thus has broad unilateral discretion to engage
U.S. military forces in hostilities abroad. Examples in the Asia-Paciﬁc region since
the Vietnam War include action to retake the captured merchant vessel Mayaguez,
deployments to the Philippines during the 1989 coup attempt, and contribution to
UN efforts to restore peace in East Timor.
Although this paper has mostly focused on U.S. domestic law related to
use of force, another quick note about international law is important here and
relates directly to these observations about presidential power: the president has
wide latitude, domestically, in interpreting international law constraints on force,
such as self-defense, and the provisions of security treaties (though usually that
interpretive power is delegated to subordinate ofﬁcers and exercised through
interagency processes). Moreover, and as explained further below, the United
States has adopted broader interpretations than most states, including close
allies like Japan, of self-defense rights under Article 51 of the UN Charter.14 These
include a broader understanding of anticipatory self-defense (though its scope
is still a matter of ongoing internal debate) and the view that any use of force—
even a small one—against the United States under Article 2(4) could also
constitute an “armed attack” triggering self-defense rights. Interpreting these
international legal constraints on force is left to the president, with Congress
playing little if any formal role and courts regarding international legal issues
of force as non-justiciable.
It is, in sum, generally understood that from the Korean War onward, the
president has exercised vast unilateral powers to use military force. The sheer scope
of this presidential authority to use force obviously contrasts sharply with Japanese
government decision-making about force. Moreover, whereas Japan’s approach is
generally premised on clear lines of what is or is not permitted in advance, the U.S.
approach is premised on the idea that security contingencies are unpredictable,
and it is better therefore to vest the government with substantial discretion as new
issues arise.

Politics, Process, and Diplomacy of
Presidential Decisions to Use Force
In some ways, the standard account of a post-WWII imperial presidency often
actually understates the president’s power. That is because the actual deployment
of forces into hostile situations is only one way in which he can use force. More
often, the president wields the threat of force to deter or coerce certain conduct by
others. With regard to East Asia, for example, the credible threat of U.S. military
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force is a signiﬁcant element of U.S. strategy for deterring Chinese and North
Korean aggression, as well as reassuring other Asian powers of U.S. protection,
to avert a destabilizing arms race.15 This includes explicit or implicit threats of
force in response to speciﬁc crises or contingencies, such as during diplomatic
confrontations with North Korea, in addition to more routine displays of force,
such as free navigation exercises in the South China Sea. As I have argued:
Decisions to go to war or to send military forces into hostilities are
immensely and uniquely consequential, so it is no surprise that debates
about constitutional war powers occupy so much attention. But one of the
most common and important ways that the United States uses its military
power is by threatening war or force—to coerce, to deter, to bargain, to
reassure—and the constitutional dimensions of that activity have received
almost no scrutiny or even theoretical investigation.16
There are no formal legal checks on the president’s power to threaten force and,
given the size of the standing U.S. military arsenal, that power to threaten force is
immense.
There are, however, signiﬁcant political checks on the president’s discretion
to use military force, and these checks also affect how the president wields threats
of force. As Jack Goldsmith and I have argued:
The United States has a long history of presidential military initiative borne
of responsibility and opportunity, and congressional acquiescence borne
of irresponsibility and collective action hurdles. This historical pattern of
executive unilateralism has not meant that the president is unchecked. It
has simply meant that the checks were political, not legal, and were imposed
by the threat of congressional retaliation if the president’s initiatives go
terribly wrong, and by the U.S. public through electoral accountability.17
In recent years there has been a wave of political science scholarship substantiating
these checks.
Douglas Kriner, for example, argues that although there has been much
literature devoted to claims of an imperial presidency, Congress exerts signiﬁcant
inﬂuence over the use of force. Congressional politics affect both the frequency with
which presidents use force abroad and the probability with which they respond
militarily to crises. There are many ways in which Congress inﬂuences presidential
uses of force, and presidents anticipate congressional reactions, such as introduction
of legislation to authorize or curtail a use of force; congressional oversight hearings;
and public debate over military policymaking.18 Congressional action or inaction also
sends signals about domestic resolve to foreign parties—including adversaries and
allies—thereby affecting the president’s calculus regarding force.19
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In their study of congressional efforts to constrain presidential war powers
during the post-World War II era, William Howell and Jon Pevehouse “discover
considerable evidence that checks and balances, though diminished, persist.”20
Although they concede the president’s unilateral powers are very substantial, they
argue that, under certain conditions, the congressional checks are constraining.
Moves by members of Congress to introduce bills, pass resolutions, hold hearings,
and make public declarations can increase political costs for presidents, and
even sometimes impose legal limits on force.21 Like Kriner, they also ﬁnd that
congressional opposition to military force reduces the president’s ability to signal
resolve to allies and inﬂuence public opinion.22
Besides congressional political checks, internal process within the U.S.
executive branch exerts signiﬁcant inﬂuence on presidential use of force. The same
post-World War II period in which constitutional practice shifted toward unilateral
presidential power also included the creation and institutionalization of formal
interagency deliberative processes for national security and crisis decision-making.
The 1947 National Security Act created the modern Department of Defense,
Central Intelligence Agency, and National Security Council (NSC). Although the
NSC has evolved, and the details of its composition and organization vary from
presidential administration to administration, it helps structure deliberation on
possible uses of force to ensure participation of key departments and agencies, as
well as the president’s principal military advisers.23
It is also through these interagency processes that the executive branch
interprets international law in this area. The recently published Department of
Defense Law of War manual describes the process this way:
Jus ad bellum issues might raise questions of national policy that, in the
Executive Branch, would be decided by the President. In U.S. practice,
legal advice provided to national-level principal ofﬁcials on such issues
generally would need to be addressed through interagency discussions
coordinated by the legal adviser to the National Security Council, including
consultation and coordination among senior counsel of relevant U.S.
departments and agencies.24
Alliance relationships also inﬂuence presidential uses of force and are
among the considerations that inform executive branch deliberations. On the one
hand, a general approach to defense planning that emphasizes military primacy
has meant that the United States has great ﬂexibility in wielding its armed might.25
Moreover, the U.S. executive branch can make decisions on the use of force more
quickly and dexterously than can allies with more cumbersome approval processes
or, as in the case of Japan, stricter restrictions on what military forces can or cannot
be called upon to do.
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On the other hand, coalition building and maintenance is often an
important strategic and political concern, constraining U.S. military actions or
threats of military force. Military-to-military ties mean that allies’ interests will
also generally exert constant, even if sometimes subtle or indirect, inﬂuence on
executive branch deliberations through the departments involved in maintaining
and exercising those relationships. This is a ripe area for further research, especially
with regard to how different alliance relationships and structures feed into U.S.
decision-making processes, particularly during crises.

North Korea and Taiwan Strait Tensions
Recent tensions and negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear weapons
development, as well as concerns about China’s ambitions toward Taiwan, help
illustrate many of the issues discussed above.
As to North Korea, although each of the previous three presidents has
reportedly considered military strikes against North Korea’s nuclear capabilities,
president Trump was initially, and prior to his summits with Kim Jong Un,
much more open about the possibility of such action than his predecessors.
Some members of Congress publicly questioned or pushed back against Trump’s
bellicosity, including suggesting that he lacks constitutional authority to take
actions without congressional authorization, but Congress as a body showed little
willingness or capacity to apply more than informal and diffuse political pressure
against a possible rush to war.26
As to the international law dimensions of the North Korea situation, the
Trump administration has been publicly reticent.27 At a 2017 Senate hearing, the
Secretaries of Defense and State conﬁrmed under questioning that the United
States lacked international legal authority to strike North Korea absent an
“imminent threat,” but they declined to clarify how they interpreted that standard
in the North Korea context.28 President Trump’s advisors had—again, prior to the
presidential summit meetings between the American and North Korean leaders—
emphasized that the window is closing for action before North Korea develops the
capability to attack the continental United States with nuclear weapons. It seems
likely that the current U.S. administration interprets “imminence” signiﬁcantly
more broadly than its East-Asian allies, especially Japan.
Besides the prospect of actual military intervention abroad, the North Korea
situation also illustrates related presidential powers for managing alliances that
can have signaling effects. As commander in chief who can deploy forces abroad,
the president can also withdraw them. President Trump has hinted at his interest
in bringing U.S. troops home from South Korea, though Congress recently passed
a statute limiting his ability to do so (and the constitutionality of that restriction
is uncertain). The president can also cancel or downgrade military exercises, as
President Trump has done with U.S.-South Korean military exercises as part of his
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diplomacy toward the peninsula.29
The Taiwan Strait is another hotspot that highlights the vast scope of
presidential powers, and especially the wide latitude presidents have to engage in
demonstrative shows of force. Ever since the United States normalized relations
with China in the 1970s, Congress has generally taken a hard line in favor of
defending Taiwan, so there has not been much political or legislative constraint
from Congress on strong executive action. In 1995, for example, after China
engaged in missile tests and other actions to intimidate Taiwan, President Clinton
ordered additional naval forces to the Taiwan area and sent some of them through
the Taiwan Strait. The Trump administration has also used naval deployments to
reinforce and signal American commitments to prevent Chinese military actions
against Taiwan (as well as China’s assertions of control in areas of the South
China Sea). As with South Korean military exercises, displays of force like this
can reassure and bolster defense of partners, but they can also provoke escalatory
responses. Such moves are almost exclusively within the president’s discretion, at
least in the absence of direct legislative restrictions to the contrary.

Conclusion
However the U.S. constitutional system was originally intended to constrain
formally the president’s military authority, the modern president in practice
wields tremendous power and discretion to initiate military operations. The
system has adapted over time to major shifts in American power and grand
strategy. Although formal, legal checks on the president’s use of force rarely
come into play, Congress nevertheless retains some political power to inﬂuence
presidential decision-making, and internal bureaucratic processes also constrain
presidential action. Q
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